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Consumers and the Recession 
As recent headlines told us, the U.S. econ-
omy fell deeply into recession during the sec-
ond quarter, with a 9.1-percent annual rate of 
decline in real GNP. That decline was the 
sharpest one of  the past generation, except for 
the equally sharp decline of first-quarter 
1975. Who was responsible for this perfor-
mance? Appropriately, it was the consum-
er-who was also largely responsible for the 
strong and prolonged expansion of  the late 
1970's. 
The current recession may turn out to be 
unusual, because ofthe possibility that the 
downturn will be concentrated in its initial 
quarter. (In fact, the Congressional Budget 
Office esti mates that that quarter wi  II accou nt 
for two-thirds of the recession's cumulative 
downturn.) In contrast, in four of six previous 
recessions, the most severe quarterly decline 
occurred in the final quarter. However, this 
recession is not yet over, and its final shape 
wi  II depend greatly on what the consumer 
does from now on. 
1975 vs. 1980 
The shift in the consumer's role can be seen 
from a comparison of the contributors to the 
real-GNP declines offirst-quarter 1975 and 
second-quarter 1980 (see chart}. In the earlier 
period, the inventory sector dominated the 
decline. Inventories had gotten far out of line 
in a period of  weakening demand, because 
business firms-responding to sharp price 
increases of raw materials-boosted their 
purchases of supplies in anticipation of 
further price increases. As a consequence, 
these firms were forced to reduce their in-
ventories severely in the early part of 1975. 
But for most other GNP components, the re-
cession already was almost over. Consump-
tion spending had already turned positive, 
and residential consumption had almost 
bottomed out-although business capital 
spending still had several quarters of decline 
ahead. 
In second-quarter 1980, in contrast, con-
sumer spending accounted for two-thirds of 
the entire decline in total output-whereas 
inventory spending actually increased some-
what as an unwanted consequence of  the 
drop in consumer spending. The drop in 
consumer purchases was concentrated in 
durable goods-especially autos, which reg-
istered their lowest selling rate in more than 
two decades. But the household spending 
decline was also reflected in a one-fifth re-
duction of residential construction spending 
from the previous quarter. 
The economy actually had been declining 
since January, according to the chronology of 
the semi-official National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research. Employment, retail sales, 
and industrial production all began to decline 
during the winter quarter, reflecting the dis-
tortions caused by the upsurge of  energy and 
other prices. 
Sources of weakness 
The second quarter was notable, however, for 
marking the culmination of an unprece-
dented rise in interest rates, whose effects 
were keenly felt throughout the household 
sector. Housing probably suffered most as 
mortgage rates soared to the range of 16 to 18 
percent, at which point home construction 
and sales skidded to a halt. Auto sales also 
reflected the high cost of credit, both for 
household purchases and dealers' flooring 
loans, which were linked to a prime business-
loan rate which peaked at 20 percent during 
this period. 
Consumer spending also reacted to the se-
vere inflation, seen most obviously in the 
11 O-percent increase in OPEC oil prices in 
1979 and early 1980. The impact spread well 
beyond autos and gasoline. As fuel costs 
climbed, transportation fares rose accord-
ingly.ln response, non-commercial travel 
dropped by 10 to 20 percent, and hotel-motel 
and related leisure services suffered in simi lar . 
fashion. Opinions e)cpreSsed in this newsletter do not 
necessariiy reflect the views of the l'Tlanagement 
of the Federa! Reserve Bank of San  Francisco, 
nor of the Board of CovenH.1rs of the Federal 
Reserve System. 
But in many respects, the consumer caution 
of mid-1980 was a response to an earlier 
spending pace which continually outpaced 
income. During 1979, for example, real con-
sumption increased only 1.6 percent, but that 
was three times that year's increase in real 
income. (Most of the consumption increase 
occurred in the second half, when income 
gains were very weald Consumers financed 
this spending/income gap partly by increas-
ing external financing, raising the ratio of 
instalment credit extensions to a record 20.3 
percent of after-tax income. Consumers also 
sharply reduced their rate of saving out of 
after-tax income, bringing it down from 5.4 
percent to 3.5 percent in the second half of 
the year. 
Consumers sharply increased their borrow-
ing in 1979, either through instalment-debt 
extensions or through inflation-enhanced 
equity in homes. Consumer credit outstand-
ing increased almost 15 percent over the pre-
vious year's level. Meanwhile, home-equity 
loans ran as high as an estimated $100 billion 
in 1979, or more than 6 percent of after-tax 
income. 
Debt and savings 
All that changed by the second quarter of 
1980, however, as consumers sharply re-
duced their new debt-to-income ratio to 14.6 
percent -almost  six percentage points below 
the year-ago figure. They were encouraged to 
cut back by the Federal Reserve's credit-
restraint program, which was imposed in 
mid-March to dampen the speculative buy-
ing that had affected many financial markets 
in the early part of  the year. The program did 
not apply to the already weakened auto and 
housing markets, but it affected credit-card 
and similar purchases as lenders took this 
opportunity to tighten credit terms much 
more than they had previously been willing 
to do. Before being removed in early July, the 
controls -along with the recession -helped 
bring aboutan almost  unprecedented second-
quarter decline of $9.0 billion in outstanding 
credit. 
In a parallel move, consumers increased their 
2 
savings rate during the second quarter-:-
savings, the residual, automatically increased 
as debt-supported spending declined. 
Whether willingly or not, consumers began 
to repair their balance sheets by reducing 
their new-debt assumption, thereby raising 
their savings rate. But the one-percent rise in 
the savings rate had the effect of reducing 
consumption spending by $17 billion below 
what it otherwise would have been. 
Repeat past trends? 
Atthis point, no one can foretell what role the 
conSumer will play in creating and sustaining 
an eventual business upturn. Over the past 
quarter-centufy, the first year of  cyclical re-
covery typically has been marked by a jump 
of 6.6 percent in real GNP. In that first robust 
year, consumers generally regain their lost 
confidence and begin buying again-and 
business firms respond by increasing their 
orders to fill out their depleted inventories, 
thus setting the stage for further increases in 
production and employment. 
Most forecasters today, although assuming a 
tu rnarou nd by the end of the year or there-
abouts, do not envision a full-scale recovery 
in 1981. The Congressional Budget Office 
recently projected real GNP growth within 
the range of 2  Y2 to 4  V2  percent between the 
fourth quarter of 1980 and the fourth quarter 
of 1981, and the Office'of Management and 
Budget came in with a forecast near the lower 
end of that range. But whatever happens, the 
consumer will playa crucial role in deter-
mining the strength of  the upturn. 
A few optimistic signs have already surfaced. 
Home-building activity increased sharply in 
June, although still lagging 37 percent behind 
the year-ago figure. Retail sales rose for the 
second straight month in July, with autos 
leading the advance, although auto sales to-
tals were still the worst for any July of  the last 
18 years. But a great deal still depends on the 
near-term state of consumer income, con-
sumer borrowing intentions, and above all, 
consumer psychology. 
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets and Liabilities 
Large Commercial Banks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total # 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total# 
Individuals, part. & corp. 
(Large negotiable CD's) 
Weekly Averages 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (+ )/Deficiency (-) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (  + )/Net borrowed{ -) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 
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Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent 
6,750  5.2 
7,656  7.1 
1,423  4.5 
7,602  19.3 
973  4.3 
1,018  - 53.9 
1,128  - 15.2 
222  1.5 
1,061  - 2.4 
175  0.6 
1,641  5.4 
10,513  20.6 
10,769  25.3 
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